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ИМПЛИЦИТНОСТЬ КОСВЕННЫХ ВЫСКАЗЫВАНИЙ (НА МАТЕРИАЛЕ ХУДОЖЕСТВЕННОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ НА АНГЛИЙСКОМ ЯЗЫКЕ)

В статье рассматривается имплицитность косвенных высказываний. Исследуются тексты, содержащие имплицитность. Предметом анализа являются монологические и ответные высказывания диалогических текстов. Содержание и смыслы повествовательных высказываний интерпретируются как просьба, объяснение, обещание, желание, предложение, сомнение, предположение и совет. Автор утверждает, что с помощью косвенных речевых актов возможно раскрытие более точного и ясного смысла, обусловленного действием принципа экономии и мышления. Изучение таких высказываний будет важным в описании подтекста и проблем коммуникативной цели предложения.

IMPLICITY OF INDIRECT UTTERANCES
(BY THE MATERIAL OF FICTION TEXTS IN ENGLISH)

In this article, utterances with implicit semantics are studied. They are understood in the informative sense as hidden, but intended for communication. The subject of analysis is monologue and response utterances of dialogue texts. Their use is accompanied by the establishment of implicative relations between segments of thought in the deep semantic structure of the text.

The actuality of the given research is defined by the importance of chosen topic and its significance for the cognitive direction in linguistic studies.

The concept of implicit in indirect utterances is viewed as an economical way of displaying the extra linguistic content, in which “as a result of a strong associative connection of the elements of the situation, the name of only one of the elements is sufficient to represent the entire situation” [2, с. 38; 3, с. 141].

The scientific novelty of the work lies in the system description of peculiarities and difficulties found in indirect utterances’ examples with implicit implicative semantics in order to understand the main idea of their usage by authors.

To achieve the stated aim in our study, we analyzed American and English authors’ fiction texts of more than 1,360 pages. There was found about 230 examples of indirect utterances with implicit semantics in them [6; 7; 8; 9; 10].

On the basis of the material the problem of secondary nomination can be considered, since the informative semantics of an unverbalized part of indirect speech acts with an implicit communicative meaning can be both explicit and implicit.

Under the conditions of a certain communicative act, the utterance can “give” more or less information than that presented by the lexico-grammatical meaning of the sentence structure. Informative or semantic increase is the implicit meaning of the utterance.

The emergence and perception of the implicit meaning in indirect utterances are determined by implicative relations in the deep structure of the text, in which the utterance is used.

The simplest cases of expressing meaning in a language are those in which the speaker, when he says an utterance, means literally what he says. In such cases, the following happens: a speaker tries to have a certain illocutionary effect on a listener. He seeks to do this, prompting the listener to recognize his intention to exert such an influence. He encourages the listener to recognize this intention on the basis of the listener’s knowledge about the rules that underlie the production of utterances.

The problem of indirect speech acts is to find out how the speaker can express not only what he means directly, but also something else with the help of some utterance. Since the meaning of the utterance is the intention to gain understanding from the listener, the problem mentioned is directed to the question of how it becomes possible for the hearer to understand the speech act, when the audible and understood sentence means something more. This problem is complicated by the fact that some proposals have already become, in our opinion, the conventional means of expressing indirect requests [4, c. 30].

The hypothesis offered by J. R. Searle is as follows: in indirect speech acts, the speaker gives to the listener more content than that he actually says, and he does it, relying on general knowledge, both linguistic and non-linguistic [5, c. 196].

So, below there is a typical example of the phenomenon of “indirection”, taken from F. Scott Fitzgerald’s novel “Tender is the Night”:

(1) Dick: Let’s go walk in the Pincio.
(2) Rosemary: I promised some people a long time ago [7, p. 185].

The statement (1) is a proposal to do something by virtue of its immediate meaning, in particular in relation to the meaning of let’s “come on”. Generally speaking, literal statements of such type are proposals to do something.

Statement (2) in this context, as a rule, is a deviation from the proposal to go for a walk, but by no means because of its immediate significance it is simply a statement that Rosemary should do. Phrases of the type do not mean...
the rejection of the offer to do something – even when they are spoken in response to such a proposal. Then the next question arises: how does Dick understand that this statement is the rejection of his proposal to do something?

This question, in our opinion, is part of another question: how is it possible for Rosemary to intend or keep in mind that the statement (2) is a rejection of the sentence? To describe this, we adopted some agreements proposed by J. R. Searle. It can be said that the primary illocutionary act [5, c. 198], carried out in the utterance (2), is a rejection of the proposal (to do something) expressed by Dick, and that Rosemary achieves this by implementing a secondary illocutionary act consisting in affirming that she promised to other people. She performs a secondary illocutionary act, uttering a sentence with such literal meaning that the literal use of this sentence ensures the fulfillment of this illocutionary act.

Therefore, we can say that the secondary illocutionary act has a literal character, unlike the primary illocutionary act.

In our study we used the sequence of some steps proposed by J. R. Searle, which were necessary for the introduction of primary illocution from word for word illocution. The process can be summarized as follows.

In a normal situation of verbal communication, no one, of course, consciously passes through the sequence of steps included in the discussion.

So, Step 1: We made some proposal to Rosemary, and in response to it she gave the statement that she promised other people to walk (facts concerning the dialogue).

Step 2: We assume that within the framework of this dialogue Rosemary behaves according to the laws of interaction and that, consequently, her retort is thought as relevant (the principles of cooperation in speech communication).

Step 3: The relevant response must be one of the following types: the acceptance of the proposal, the rejection of the proposal, the counter of the proposal, the discussion of the proposal.

Step 4: However, the literal utterance of Rosemary does not belong to any of these types and, therefore, is not the relevant answer.

Step 5: Therefore, she probably implies more than she herself expressed. The assumption that her retort is relevant implies that her primary illocutionary point must differ from her literal illocutionary aim. This step, in our opinion, is of decisive importance. If the listener does not follow a strategy of some reasoning constructing establishment the primary illocutionary aims become different from literal illocutionary ones. So he (the hearer) does not have the means to understand indirect illocutionary acts.

Step 6: We know that a walk usually takes a considerable time and we know that a walk in Pincio also takes time (background information).

Step 7: So, apparently, she can’t go with Dick and people she promised.

Step 8: The preparatory condition for accepting some proposal (as for any other act) is the ability to implement an act produced in a case of propositional content.

Step 9: Therefore, we know that she said something, from which it follows that she probably can’t accept the offer.

Step 10: Summarizing all up, we understood that her primary illocutionary aim was probably to reject the proposal.

In our work we realized that the theoretical apparatus used to explain the example chosen by us from “Tender is the Night” by F. Scott Fitzgerald will be sufficient to explain the general phenomenon of indirect illocutionary acts. This apparatus includes background information, the theory of speech acts and certain specific principles of verbal communication.

In particular, in the analysis of this example, we did not have to assume that the utterance (2) was ambiguous, or that it was “ambiguous in the context” or that it was necessary to allow the existence of certain postulates of verbal communication to explain Dick’s understanding of the primary illocution contained in this utterance.

Having studied F. Scott Fitzgerald’s novel, we come to the conclusion that the strategy of inference is:

1) in establishing the fact that the primary illocutionary aim deviates from the literal aim;
2) in revealing the very content of the primary illocutionary aim.

The fact is that due to the accepted requirements of politeness in speech communication, it is often inappropriate to utter direct imperative sentences.

Based on the theory of speech acts we can say that utterances are correlated with the motives, aims or operations of a person’s practical activity. Speech act is primarily in the regulatory function, allowing a person to carry out joint activities with other people.

The communicative purpose in this case can be correlated with the objectives of the activity. The main aim is the change in the addressee’s behavior. So, the initial communicative purpose is motivation.

The problem of modeling of communicative processes covers two circles of phenomena, which are designated by the terms “understanding” and “verbalization”. Understanding and verbalization are two kinds of functioning of language mechanism. The verbalizer (speaker / writer) enters into communication in order to be understood. The interpreter (listener / reader) tries to calculate what his partner wants to verbalize in communication. The analysis of indirect speech utterances leads to the recognition that the linguistically marked ways of linguistic expression have a communicative meaning. The interpretation refers to the domain of verbal meaning paraphrasing problems.

From a number of known meanings of the terms “communicative” and “semantic” those are used that are defined as follows:

1) as related to the information generated under the conditions of the communicative act, with the active role of the speaker and the listener, attracting additional factors outside the text;

2) as related to semantics, formed on the basis of the utterance. Additional outside the texts factors consist of presumption of communication, or presupposition knowledge of communicants relevant to this speech act.
In terms of expression, the main part of both verbalized and nonverbalized segment of thought is the utterance that is incomplete language realization of the inference model. The incompleteness of its linguistic realization determines the implicit nature of the utterance in terms of content and incompleteness in the expression plan. An incomplete expression in the expression plan (the verbalized part of the inference model) is a sign of using its other constituent parts in the semantic structure of the text. They are present in the creation of the semantic content of the text.

The structure of the utterance is described both on a surface level (in terms of the parts of speech that make up the utterance of lexemes, the order of words), and on a deep level (in terms of propositional functions). In connection with this, the concept of the semantic structure of the utterance expanded and supplemented. Its content side is a complex set of meanings. Along with the basic semantic content-proposition, the utterance is also characterized by predicativity, modality, actual division and presuppositions. Informative and semantic increment is the implicit meaning of the utterance.

Indirect utterances are linguistically represented by communicative forms of sentence: narrative, interrogative, stimulating, which participate in the processes of syntagmatic substitution. Having studied the theoretical material on implicity, we came to the conclusion that the theory of speech acts gave a detailed presentation of the semantics of the sentence-utterance.

Therefore, we use the achievements of the speech acts’ theory to clarify the processes of syntagmatic substitution, in which implicity appears [Там же, с. 196].

According to the following syntagmatic substitution scheme proposed by A. G. Baranov, the features of the paradigm of communicative types of sentences are presented [1, с. 61].

**Syntagmatic Substitution Scheme:**

1. Narrative type ———> Stimulating type
2. Narrative type ———> Interrogative type
3. Interrogative type ———> Stimulating type
4. Interrogative type ———> Narrative type

However, in this paper, we analyzed only narrative utterances, trying to discover their rich and diverse communicative semantics in the communicative situation of speech acts. The analysis of the utterances showed that the narrative type of the utterance can have the following inner content and meaning:

**1. Request**

a) “We are very hungry” [9, p. 52].

With a simple narrative sentence, the speaker lets the listener know that he needs food. He does not say it directly, but with the help of indirectness he expresses a desire, a request to give him something to eat.

b) “The people are very tired, Enie” [Там же, p. 361].

Due to the context in this case, the following presuppositions follow:

1) people need rest, give them rest rooms;
2) please take care of people, because hostilities will start tomorrow.

**2. Explanation**

“No one did tell me you were coming back to us” [6, p. 40].

So, in this case, there will be such presuppositions as:

1) I would have met you if I had known;
2) I’m not guilty;
3) I did not know that you would come.

**3. Promise**

“And I will not say what I think about the general who is killing me every day” [9, p. 360]. (And I will not tell anyone about what I think about the general who terrorizes me every day.)

From this passage the conclusion follows: the speaker promises to the listener that he will not tell anyone and for anything in the world the secret that he knows about his general. And also he expresses his dissatisfaction with the fact that the general ‘kills’ and ‘destroys’ him every day.

**4. Desire**

“I wish I had a cigarette. That's more important to me just now” [7, p. 7].

The speaker wants at the moment a cigarette and, when he says “I wish I had a cigarette”, he asks for what he wants from the listener.

**5. Suggestion**

“– The kettle boils. – Thank you” [8, p. 116].

In this example, we can identify the following situation. The person came to visit and instead of direct “do you want to drink a cup of tea?” he heard “boiling kettle”. It follows that the people who came to visit are very close to the owner of the house, as he unceremoniously spoke with them. As it can be seen from the passage, this answer can be interpreted as follows:

1) – Thank you, we do not want;
2) – Thank you, we will have a cup of tea with pleasure.

This analysis is done without context. And if we connect with the context here, the presupposition will be as follows: “Thank you, with pleasure we will drink a cup of tea.”
6. Doubt

“It's not much like Christmas” [9, p. 133]. Using the context in which this indirect speech act is used, we found the following presuppositions:
1) there is no gift;
2) there is no cranberry (which is always on the table on Christmas days);
3) there is no turkey (English custom, which is an important part of the festive table);
4) there is no wine;
5) so, there is no joy and happiness of the coming holiday.
Thus, the speaker has a doubt as to whether the holiday has come or not.

7. Assumption

“People will run away with a story.” [10, p. 113].
The speaker suggests that soon the whole district will know about what happened and people will gossip about everyone involved in the story. So, it’s better to keep silence about it. People are with malicious intent. They do not have mercy on anybody.

8. Advice

“Why not join some else’s party?” [6, p. 8].
This example shows how the speaker encouraging the listener invites him to join a party. He expects disappointment, so due to the context the listener rejects the advice, because he has other plans for this evening.

Summarizing the results of our analysis of different texts in English, we consider that it is necessary to give brief internal contents and meanings of narrative utterances that are interpreted as: request, explanation, promise, desire, suggestion, doubt, assumption and advice. Consequently, with the help of indirect speech acts, in which there is implicity, it is possible to disclose more complete, clear, accurate information that is hidden in utterances, so that in the process of dialogue a speaker does not offend, humiliate or insult a listener. This is an excellent way out of the difficult situations that appear directly during the dialogue. The derivation of implicit meaning and its expression in linguistic forms is due to the principle of economy and thinking.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the study of indirect utterances with implicit implicative semantics with a complex of opposite analysis of sentences’ communicative types will give new results in description of such phenomenon as a nature of subtext and problems of the communicative aim of a sentence related to its formal-grammatical structure connected with it. The analysis of indirect utterances with implicative semantics will provide new material for further research on the problems of language and thought communication, logic and grammar.